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Abstract
Advertising becomes one of the most popular ways of monetizing an online transaction plat-
form. Usually, sponsored advertisements are posted on the most attractive positions to enhance
the number of clicks. However, multiple e-commerce platforms are aware that this action may
hurt the search experience of users, even though it can bring more incomes. To balance the
advertising revenue and the user experience loss caused by advertisements, most e-commerce
platforms choose fixing some areas for advertisements and adopting some simple restrictions on
the number of ads, such as a fixed numberK of ads on the top positions or one advertisement for
every N organic searched results. Different from these common rules of treating the allocation
of ads separately (from the arrangements of the organic searched items), in this work we build
up an integrated system with mixed arrangements of advertisements and organic items. We fo-
cus on the design of truthful mechanisms to properly list the advertisements and organic items
and optimally trade off the instant revenue and the user experience. Furthermore, for different
settings and practical requirements, we extend our optimal truthful allocation mechanisms to
cater for these realistic conditions. Finally, with the aid of the real data, our experimental results
verify the improvement of our mechanism compared to the classic Myerson optimal advertising
mechanism.
1 Introduction
With the development of Internet and mobile devices, e-commerce platforms have become the most
fashionable online marketplace to bridge merchants and consumers, whose popularity is originated
from its convenient shopping mode. That is, whenever and wherever consumers want to pick up
their desirable products, they only require to enter a relevant keyword into the search bar of Apps
of e-commerce platforms by mobile devices. Then, platforms will return a list of the matching
products in the search result pages provided to be selected. Hence, how to recommend products
accurately and effectively is a considerable problem of platforms, which also affects both the the
short-run revenue and long-run prosperity of e-commerce platforms.
Nowadays, in one standard webpage of search results, based on a given keyword, it usually
presents two types of items, organic search results and sponsored advertisements1, distributed in two
area, mainline and sidebar. In the mainline, both two kinds of items are displayed. Generally,
sponsored advertisements are located on the top several positions above the organic search results.
As for the sidebar, alongside the mainline, it is only used to show the sponsored advertisements.
In addition, for the result page of mobile devices, it only contains the mainline. In this research,
we are only concerned about the allocation of items in the mainline, i.e., how to order sponsored
advertisements and organic search results in the mainline. Traditionally, organic search results
*Dept. of IEDA, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. {wlibn, kaylaqi}@ust.hk.
†Beijing Institute for Scientific and Engineering Computing, Beijing University of Technology. wcj@bjut.edu.cn.
1Sponsored advertisements are usually labeled by “Sponsored” or “Ad” to be distinguished with organic search results.
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and sponsored advertisements are totally separate components in the process of arranging items.
First, e-commerce platforms will decide how many top positions are used to display advertisements,
and then run a preset auction mechanism, like generalized second price auction (GSP), to output
the ads. For the rest positions, they are used to show the organic items ranked by the relevance
of items or other criteria which depend on different platforms (e.g., see Avrachenkov and Litvak
(2004); Austin (2006); Williams (2010)).
The first step of the above process is so-called Sponsored Search Auction, which is first launched
by Google at the end of 20th century. Several common pricing models can be adopted in sponsored
search auctions, like pay-per-click, pay-per-impression and pay-per-action. In this paper, we focus
on the pay-per-click model which means that, for the winners of auction, they only pay when their
advertisements are clicked. Because of the millions of search everyday, sponsored search auction
can bring a vast amount of money to platforms instantly. On the other hand, due to the dissatis-
faction with the ranking of organic items, some merchants also hope to join the auction (becoming
the advertisers) and charge some extra money for improving the position and drawing more atten-
tion from customers. Therefore, sponsored search auction has become the vital incoming source of
e-commerce platform today. Different from the first step, ranking organic items aims to enhance
the efficiency of search and user experience, so its criterion is usually the relevance of items. In this
investigation, we consider exploiting a relatively comprehensive but very simple indicator to reflect
relevance, that is, the expected gross merchandise volume (GMV), or the expected sale amount
to rank the organic items with two reasons. The first reason is that the expected GMV includes
the user’s interest in browsing the product (click rate), the detailed purchase tendency (conversion
rate), and the decision after the balance between price and product quality. In another word, the
expected GMV can directly or indirectly reflect the user experience. The second reason is that,
nowadays, most e-commerce platforms regard GMV as a criterion to measure how much they take
over the whole market, and compete for GMV during some shopping ceremonies.
However, due to some specialty of e-commerce platforms, like that the sponsored advertise-
ments are also the organic items essentially, still insisting on the conventional pattern and re-
garding sponsored advertisements and organic results as independent sections may expose some
downsides: (a) obviously, it is not appropriate for different keywords to use the same number of
positions providing for ads. The conventional pattern cannot automatically solve the above prob-
lem; (b) to optimize the user experience, the platform will list the organic results according to their
expected transaction volume or their expected sale quantities (these volumes or quantities are well
known by the platforms), i.e., the item with the highest expected “volume” will be shown in the first
slot (exclude the slots for advertisements), the item with the second highest expected “volume” will
be shown in the second slot, and so on. Nevertheless, during the sponsored search auction, if some
items with low volume would rather pay high price to get more clicks, by the goal of sponsored
search auction, maximizing the instant revenue, these items will be picked up, which will harm the
platforms’ expected GMV and the long-run profits. In view of the above points, is it still a great
idea to fix the ad positions in advance? Can the platforms do better if they weighing the allocation
of the sponsored advertisements and the organic results at the same time, not separately? If yes,
how to balance the two conflicting objectives of user experience (i.e., GMV) and instant advertising
revenue in designing mechanisms? Furthermore, how to design the optimal mechanisms with the
integrated allocation? The answer to the first question is “No”, and we give an example(shown in
Appendix A.1) to illustrate that both GMV and revenue will be better if we consider organic results
and sponsored advertisements at the same time (answering the second question simultaneously).
In reality, on some platforms such as Tmall, Taobao etc, the advertisements and organic items
have already been combined together to display. However, the currently used mixed allocation
rules are still very heuristic. For example, always take out one slot for advertisement of every N
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displaying slots. Motivated by this, in this work, we will, from the theoretical aspect, try to study
how to design truthful mechanisms to optimally trade off the expected revenue and volume for this
new integrated setting (answering the third question and fourth question proposed above). To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt on studying auction mechanism design with
multiple objectives in the new layout of these mixed arrangements.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Novelty—We initially build up an integrated model to describe the layout of mixed arrange-
ments of organic results and sponsored advertisements, called an integrated ad system (IAS),
where two main objectives, revenue and GMV, are considered. We propose two general kinds
of problems with two different ways to trade off the revenue and GMV: unconstrained prob-
lem of linearly combining the volume and revenue as a single objective; constrained problem
of bounding the volume and maximizing the revenue (see Section 2.3).
• Techniques—For the unconstrained problem, we prove that the optimal truthful mechanism
can be obtained by a transformation on objectives and then allocating the items by their “re-
vised virtual values”. For the constrained problem, using variables relaxation and Lagrangian
dual methods, we show that the constrained problem can be transformed into an uncon-
strained problem by properly choosing a parameter. Then we give a numerical algorithm to
compute the desired parameter, thus deriving the optimal truthful mechanism for the con-
strained problem.
• Extensions—We extend our study to three general settings with practical restrictions: re-
quiring an upper bound of the total number of advertisements, and requiring certain sparsity
of the allocation of advertisements where for the later, we divide it into two models with
different restriction on the sparsity. However, under these restrictions, some good properties
will not exist anymore, but by some more delicate treatments, we can still design the optimal
mechanisms for both constrained and unconstrained problems.
• Practicability—Using real data, we first verify that our mechanisms can be implemented as
planned. Then comparing with currently used mechanism, we show the superiority of our
mechanisms. At last, we take the correlation between value and weight of advertisers into
account, our mechanisms still perform better.
1.2 Related Work
Sponsored Search Auction. Auction lies in the core of mechanism design research, while spon-
sored search auction has been an area of great focus in computer science in the last twenty years.
For the traditional revenue optimization, Myerson (1981) solved the problem for single item in
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium setting. Maskin and Riley (2000) studied multi-unit optimal auction.
From the first launch of sponsored search auction in 1997, a series of auction mechanisms are put
forward, like generalized first price(GFP) auction by Overture and generalized second price(GSP)
by Google, which makes sponsored search auction become a vital incoming source of variable
online platforms in practise. Aggarwal et al. (2006) showed that the lower bound of revenue pro-
duced by GSP, the most popular mechanism is equal to the revenue of classic VCG mechanism
(Vickrey (1961); Clarke (1971); Groves et al. (1973)). Due to the untruthfulness of GSP, Edelman
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et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) independently examined the behavior of bidders and proposed
locally envy-free equilibrium(LEFE) and symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE), respectively. Another
idea of a squashing parameter of GSP to improve the revenue was proposed by Lahaie and Pen-
nock (2007).Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) applied these works and studied its effects on Yahoo!
auction using the optimal reserve price. Thompson and Leyton-Brown (2013) also studied sev-
eral different techniques for increasing the revenue, including via several different reserve prices,
squashing, combinations of a reserve price and squashing, ect. Rather than using the reserve price
simply as a minimum bid, Roberts et al. (2016) presented the idea of incorporating the reserve
price into ranking score and showed that this mechanism may increase the revenue compared to
the squashing mechanism. For the topic of user experience, Abrams and Schwarz (2007) intro-
duced a concept of hidden cost, which was advertiser-specific and represented the quality of the
ads’ landing page. Athey and Ellison (2011) studied a model that introduced the users’ search cost,
and showed that reserve price can improve users’ welfare. Li et al. (2013) defined the shadow cost,
which is revenue reduction in long run and depends on both advertiser and slot. As for the trade-
offs among different objectives, there are also some related studies. Likhodedov and Sandholm
(2003) first studied the problem of designing optimal mechanisms to balance revenue and welfare.
Sundararajan and Talgam-Cohen (2016) considered the convex combination of revenue and wel-
fare to improve the prediction. Bachrach et al. (2014) applied the linear combination of different
objectives as their objective function. Shen and Tang (2017) introduced a class of parameterized
mechanisms to balance different objectives.
Rank of organic results. Besides the methods (Avrachenkov and Litvak (2004); Austin (2006);
Williams (2010)) used in practise, there are still multiple theoretical investigations about ranking
organic results, recently. Crowcroft (2007) first incorporated bias of search results into considera-
tion, when ranking the items. In the next few years, this topic is still studied by many researchers,
e.g., Edelman and Lockwood (2011); Wright (2011); Maille´ and Tuffin (2014). LEcuyer et al.
(2017) showed how to optimally rank search results to maximize an objective that combines search-
result relevance and sales revenue. Chu et al. (2017) studied the optimal ranking rule of multiple
objectives includes consumer and seller surplus, as well as the sales revenue, taking consumers’
choice into consideration.
However, all these work treats the sponsored search auction separately and does not consider
the mixed arrangement of organic results and advertisements. We design an integrated system that
takes both organic items and paid advertisements into consideration together.
Our organizations. In section 2, we give all the necessary notations and definitions, and build
up the modelling framework of the integrated ad system. Two core optimization problems are
also proposed in this section. In section 3, we consider designing optimal mechanisms for these
two problems. In section 4, we generalize our study to more practical settings and design the
corresponding optimal mechanisms. The numerical experiments are given in section 5 to illustrate
the performance of our mechanisms. Finally, we summarize our works and put forward several
open problems in the section 6.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
2.1 Integrated Ad System
In the classic ad auction, advertisers bid for the keywords, and the pre-set advertising slots, which
are separated from organic search result, are allocated to the ads with highest bids. In this paper,
we propose a new model called integrated ad system (IAS) which caters for e-commerce online
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platforms, where both the positions and total number of advertising slots are not determined in ad-
vance. After collecting bids from advertisers, the platform decides how to rank all items (including
ad items and organic items) and how much each ad item should pay.
We start with a formal description of the IAS. In an IAS, there are n1 advertisers and n2 organic
results competing for K available slots of one search-result page simultaneously. For simplicity, we
call advertisements and organic results as ad item and organic items, respectively. Denote A as the
set of ad items and O as the set of organic items, and exploit i ∈ A or i ∈ O to represent an ad
item or an organic item. Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} index the slots. Generally, a higher position slot has
a smaller index. For the kth slot, βk stands for its effective exposure. Without lose of generality,
assume that β1 > β2 > . . . > βK > 0.
Each (ad or organic) item i has a quality (weight) factor wi to reflect its relative popularity
compared to other items. In addition, each item i’s estimate merchandise volume per click is gi
that is well known by the platform and advertisers. In detail, the estimate merchandise volume
is an attribute that represents the expected sale amount per click. For ease of representation,
we call gi volume, instead. Each ad item i still has an extra private value vi per click. More
specifically, vi means that the advertisers want to charge extra vi to gain one click. Suppose that
vi is independently (not necessarily identical) drawn from [0, ui] according to a publicly known
distribution Fi(vi) whose respective pdf is fi(vi). Given this, the virtual value of ad item i can be
represented as φi(vi) = vi −
(
1− Fi(vi)
)
/fi(vi). We assume that the distribution Fi(vi) satisfies the
regular condition, which implies that φi(vi) is monotone non-decreasing. For the organic items, we
have the following assumption:
Assumption 1. For any organic item i, we assume its valuation is always 0, i.e., vi is drawn from the
degenerate distribution with one support point 0. 2.
In the IAS, we consider the separable click-through-rate(CTR) model. That is, if the item i
is allocated to slot k, the item i’s CTR is wiβk. It means that if we put an item into a slot, the
probability of being clicked is affected not only by the position but also by itself. Similarly, the
corresponding merchandise volume is giwiβk.
For convenience, we summarize the above symbols in Table 3 shown in Appendix A.2 for easily
reading. In summary, the sponsored search auctions in IAS can be described as: 1. The platform
release the information of slots; 2. The advertisers submit a bid price based on the value; 3. The
platform ranks all ad items and organic items simultaneously and decides how much the advertisers
should charge.
2.2 Mechanism Design
Let v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn1) and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn1) be the value profile and the bid profile of all ad
items. We may use v−i and b−i to represent the value profile and bid profile of all ad items except
ad item i.
In the IAS, after receiving the bids from advertisers, a mechanismM = (x(b), p(b)) consists of
two rules, the allocation rule x(b) and payment rule p(b). More specifically, x(b) = (x1(b), x2(b), . . . ,
xn1+n2(b))
3 and p(b) = (p1(b), p2(b), . . . , pn1(b)), where xi(b) =
∑K
k=1 xik(b)βk and xik(b) is the
indicator function to imply whether item i is assigned to slot k. Note that the CTR of item i is
wixi(b).
2This assumption can be understood as that any organic items have no intention to charge extra money for click
numbers. They do not submit any price to platform and make no contribution to the instant revenue.
3In the IAS, since we allow that ad items and organic items display in a mixture configuration, the outcome of an
mechanism decides how to allocate both two types of items, simultaneously.
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Since one slot should be allocated to one item and one item should be assigned to at most one
slot, xik(b) must satisfy the following constraints, denoted by X :∑
k
xik(b) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ A or O,∑
i∈A
xik(b) +
∑
i∈O
xik(b) = 1, ∀k,
xik(b) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, k.
Given allocation rule and payment rule, the expected utility of ad item i with bid bi, can be
expressed as:
Ui(x, p, bi) =
∫
V−i
(
vi − pi(bi, v−i)
)
wixi(bi, v−i)f−i(v−i)dv−i (1)
In the IAS, to guarantee that advertisers have a desire to participate in the auction, we require
that the utility of ad item should not be less than zero.
Definition 1 (Individual Rationality).
Ui(x, p, bi) ≥ 0, ∀bi ∈ [0, ui], ∀i ∈ A.
In this paper, we also hope to design mechanisms that avoid advertisers false reporting. Since
our model is in Bayesian setting, we consider the mechanisms with Bayesian Incentive Compatibil-
ity (BIC).
Definition 2 (Bayesian Incentive Compatibility).
Ui(x, p, vi) ≥ Ui(x, p, bi), ∀bi ∈ [0, ui], ∀i ∈ A.
We call a mechanism feasible iff it is IR, BIC and satisfies the condition X . Fortunately, Myerson
(1981) has already given the equivalent characterization of IR, BIC mechanisms. With a little
refinement, we can design mechanisms with IR and BIC in IAS as the following.
Lemma 1 (Myerson 1981). A mechanism is IR, BIC if and only if, for any ad item i and bids of other
items b−i fixed,
1. xi(bi, b−i) is monotone non-decreasing on bi.
2. pi(b) = bi −
∫ bi
0 xi(si,b−i)dsi
xi(b)
, when xi(b) 6= 0; Otherwise, pi(b) = 0.
In the following of this paper, we only concentrate on designing feasible mechanisms and use
vi to represent the bid price bi directly for convenience.
2.3 Core Problems
As mentioned before, e-commerce platforms, unlike conventional search engines, are concerned
about instant revenue from ad items and GMV from both ad items and organic items. Recall the
notations in Subsection 2.1 and 2.2, the revenue and GMV are respectively given by
Revenue =
∫
V
∑
i∈A
pi(v)wixi(v)f(v)dv (2)
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and
GMV =
∫
V
[∑
i∈A
giwixi(v) +
∑
i∈O
giwixi(v)
]
f(v)dv. (3)
In this subsection, we put forward two different approaches to trade off the two objectives. The
first approach is to think about the linear convex combination of the revenue and the GMV directly.
Specifically, given a coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] in advance, our problem is to find an optimal mechanism
to maximize their convex combination with α. We call this problem as Unconstrained Problem.
Unconstrained Problem UCST (α) Given the weighted coefficient α ∈ [0, 1], the unconstrained
problem UCST (α) can be written as
max
x∈X
α · Revenue + (1− α) · Volume. (4)
The second approach is that we optimize one metric while restricting the other metric. This
problem is called Constrained Problem. In this paper, we always put GMV into constraints and
optimize the revenue. Hence, in this problem, a threshold of GMV, denoted by V0, is always given
in advance.
Constrained Problem CST (V0) Given a threshold V0, the constrained problem CST (V0) can be
written as
max Revenue (P1)
s.t. Volume ≥ V0 (C1.1)
x ∈ X (C1.2)
3 The Optimal Mechanisms for the IAS
In this section, we will mainly explore the optimal feasible mechanisms for both unconstrained
problem and constrained problem. In the section 4, we extend the results in this section to more
general background.
From our intuition, if there is no ad items, i.e., nobody will submit a bid, the platform will
rank organic items by their volume naturally, because the whole process does not involve revenue.
Because the organic item will not influence the revenue, even if ad items appear, the order among
organic items does not change, as well. Therefore, the problem of designing the optimal mechanism
is, in fact, how to pick up appropriate ad items and insert them properly into the list of organic items
to achieve the optimal goals. More specifically, we need to design the optimal ranking criterion to
incorporate the ad items without disturbing the order of organic items, and the corresponding
payment function. For simplicity, we can define I = A ∪ O as the new set to represent all items.
Formally, we also extend v, b, p(b) to n1 + n2 dimensions.
3.1 The Unconstrained Problem
For the unconstrained problem with fully mixed allocation of the ads and organic items, we aim
to find the criterion of rank to insert ad items into the sequence of organic items optimally. Be-
cause there is no other constraint except for the feasibility, we can simply the objective function by
some mathematical transformations to an easily observed form which can help us find the optimal
ranking rule, shown in the Lemma 2.
7
Lemma 2. To maximize the objective function (4), the mechanism needs to maximize the objective∫
V
∑
i∈I
(αφi(vi) + (1− α)gi)wixi(v)f(v)dv − α
∑
i∈I
Ui(x, p, 0). (5)
The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.1. Because p(b) only appear in Ui(x, p, 0) and
we need to guarantee the property of IR, by Lemma 1, if we choose
pi(v) = vi −
∫ vi
0 xi(si, v−i)dsi
xi(v)
(6)
as payment rule, then Ui(x, p, 0) will be 0 and we only need to consider to select appropriate x(b)
to maximize the first part of (5).
As for allocation rule, we define ψi(vi)
def
= (αφi(vi) + (1 − α)gi)wi as the revised virtual value
of item i. It is not difficult to check that the following allocation rule can maximize the first part of
formula (5).
xik(v) =
{
1 if ψi(vi) is the kth-highest revised virtual value, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
0 otherwise.
(7)
Note that since φi(vi) is regular, ψi(vi) is non-decreasing as well. Consequently, xi(v) satisfies the
non-decreasing, when fix v−i.
By the argument above, we can obtain the optimal feasible mechanism for unconstrained prob-
lem by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Given α ∈ [0, 1], the mechanismM = (x(v), p(v)), where x(v) and p(v) are described by
(7) and (6), is the optimal feasible mechanism for the unconstrained problem UCST (α).
Proof. By Lemma 1, xi(b) and pi(b) decide the feasibility of this mechanism. Meanwhile, for any
bid profile b, xi(b) and pi(b) also achieve maximum of objective, due to Lemma 2. Therefore, this
mechanism is the optimal feasible mechanism.
The optimal mechanism of the unconstrained problem has been given above. We will explain
more about the optimal mechanism. For the special case that all items are organic items. It is
intuitive to rank them by their volumes, since they all does not submit a bidding. Our mechanism
exactly has the same rank as this, because our mechanism ranks items by ψi(vi) = (αφi(vi) + (1−
α)gi)wi = (1 − α)giwi. It is equivalent to ranking them by their volume. Based on this point of
view, we can regard the rank of general case in another perspective. For ad items, the term φi(vi)
is different from that of organic item. In the same ranking criterion, we can rank the organic items
first, then insert ad items optimally by ranking score ψi(vi). Another fact is that there exists no
redundant slots that no items are assigned into. This is because, for the organic items, their revised
virtual value is always greater than zero, which makes that, at least, the organic items can be shown
in the result list. This point is also the difference with the classic Myerson auction which may not
allocate items. In another words, our mechanism is based on the structure of Myerson auction, but
allocation result is different. Finally, for the organic items, they also have the payment rule p(b),
but we can find that this value will be always equal to 0, which meets the practical requirement.
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3.2 The Constrained Problem
In this subsection, we mainly concentrate on the constrained problem.
Since xik(v) is not a continuous function about bids v, we first relax constraints xik(v) ∈ {0, 1}
in (C1.2) to xik(v) ∈ [0, 1] and denote the relaxed (C1.2) as X¯ . Note that finally we still need to
guarantee the final optimal allocations xik(v) ∈ {0, 1}. The relaxed constrained problem is
max R(x)
def
=
∫
V
∑
i∈I
wipi(v)xi(v)f(v)dv (P2)
s.t. V (x)
def
=
∫
V
∑
i∈I
giwixi(v)f(v)dv ≥ V0 (C2.1)
x ∈ X¯ (C2.2)
Given this, we can prove that Program (P2) is a convex optimization by Lemma 3 and satisfies the
strong duality by Theorem 2.
Lemma 3. The Program (P2) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. Since R(x) is linear function of x and (C2.1) is linear constraint on x, and X¯ is convex set,
the Program (P2) is a convex optimization.
Theorem 2. If there exists a feasible allocation x0 ∈ X¯ , i.e., V (x0) ≥ V04, The Program (P2) satisfies
strong duality, .
Proof. This theorem can be derived from the refined Slater’s condition (Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004)).
Given an reachable V0, then strong duality holds, which implies that
max
x:x∈X¯ ,V (x)≥V0
R(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Primal
= min
λ≥0
max
x∈X¯
(
R(x) + λ(V (x)− V0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dual
= min
λ≥0
max
x∈X¯
[∫
V
∑
i∈I
(pi(bi) + λgi)wixi(b)f(b)db− λV0
]
.
Observing the inner maximization problem of the dual problem, when given a λ, it is an uncon-
strained problem with relaxed feasible region X¯ . The following lemma guarantees that even though
we relax the feasible region, the optimal solution x∗ik still is 0 or 1, for any i, k.
Lemma 4. The inner problem of dual problem has one 0-1 form optimal solution. That is, for any v,
x∗ij(v) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The coefficient matrix of X¯ is totally unimodular matrix (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998)).
Therefore, the optimal solution x∗ij(v) is integral form, i.e., 0-1 form.
Therefore, the optimal solution can be obtained by mechanismM with α = 1/(λ+ 1), that is,
xλik(v) =
{
1 if ψλi (vi) is the kth-highest, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
0 otherwise.
(8)
4The condition of Theorem 2 can be checked by Mechanism M with α = 0 which can find the maximum of GMV. On
the other hand, if the threshold is so high that the maximum of GMV can not reach, then the V0 will make no sense.
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where ψλi (vi)
def
= [(φi(vi) + λgi)wi]/(λ+ 1). pλi (v) can be derived by replacing xik(v) with x
λ
ik(v) in
(6).
As for the outer problem, according to the complementary-slackness, the optimal λ∗ satisfies
λ∗(V (xλ∗)− V0) = 0. Hence, either λ∗ = 0 or V (xλ∗)− V0 = 0 must hold. Testing whether λ∗ = 0
can be implemented by running the optimal mechanism in Section 3.1 with α = 1 and compare the
corresponding GMV with V0. For the second case, we can first show that V (xλ) is monotone on λ.
We show this proof in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 5. V (xλ) is non-decreasing on λ.
Because it only contains one variable λ, we come up with a Dichotomy, Algorithm 1 shown in
Appendix B.3, to output the optimal λ∗. Plugging the optimal λ∗ into xλik(v) and p
λ
ik(v), we derive
the optimal feasible mechanism, M¯ = (xλ∗i (v), pλ
∗
i (v)), for the constrained problem.
Owing to the strong duality, the constrained problem is equivalent to an unconstrained problem
in some sense, if we choose a proper parameter. Therefore, we have the following theorem to
demonstrate their relationship.
Theorem 3. The constrained problem with threshold V0 is equivalent to one unconstrained problem
with coefficient α∗, where α∗ = 1/(λ∗ + 1) and λ∗ is the optimal Lagrangian multiplier in the con-
strained problem.
4 Extensions
When allowing that advertisements and organic items can be arranged in a fully hybrid way, one
inevitable problem is that sometimes there may be too many ad items displaying in the optimal
allocation. Even though this type of allocations can achieve the optimal tradeoff, these scenarios
will hurt the e-commerce platform in the long run. In this section, we generalize the integrated
system to tailor for more practical requirements. We make two extensions: one is to restrict the
number of ad items shown in one result page, the other is to add the constraint on the sparsity of
ad items.
4.1 The Integrated Ad System with Number Budget on Ad Items
In this subsection, we still study designing optimal mechanisms with an extra requirement of
bounding the total number of ad items. Formally, if we require the number of ad items within
c, we only need to add constraint
∑
i∈A
∑
k xik(v) ≤ c into X and denote new constraints as X ′.
From Lemma 1, 2 and mechanism M, we have known that items are ranked by their revised
virtual values, ψi(vi). Since ad items appear at most c times in the new optimal mechanims, when
we rank, it is easy to check that we only need to take the top c ad items ordered by their highest
revised virtual value into account. In view of this point, we refine the mechanism M to derive
M′(c).
MechanismM′(c).
1. Sort all ad items into non-increasing order by ψi(vi). Remain the top c ad items;
2. For all remaining items, run mechanismM with coefficient α;
3. The payment rule p′(v) has the same form as (6).
As for constrained problem, we want to exploit the similar analysis that relax the problem
and implement Lagrangian Dual Method, used in Section 3.2. However, the main difficulty here
10
is that after adding the number restriction, the coefficient matrix of X ′ is not totally unimodular
anymore. Then similar result as Lemma 4 can not be directly proved by the total unimodularity.
If the relaxed problem can not be guaranteed to always have 0-1 form optimal solutions, then
the Lagrangian Dual Method does not work here. Fortunately, we can still manage to show that
the relaxed problem still has 0-1 form optimal solutions by constructing an equivalent min-cost
max-flow problem. We show our construction in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 4. For the IAS with budget on ad items, the relaxed inner problem of constrained problem
can be constructed as a min-cost max-flow problem, and has a 0-1 form optimal solution.
By Theorem 4, we can solve the constrained problem under this new setting using a similar
Lagrangian dual method as that of Section 3.2. Therefore, we can still design the optimal feasible
mechanisms for both problems when limiting the number of ad items.
4.2 The Sparse Integrated Ad System
In this subsection, we will investigate the optimal mechanisms that can control the distribution of
ad items. It is motivated by the reality that some e-commerce platforms hope that ad items appear
intermittently, rather than emerge together.
4.2.1 The Sparsity on Row
When we search the products by personal computer on e-commerce platforms, the search results
are usually shown in several rows and each row contains several items. Inspired by this layout,
we hope to constrain the number of ads in each row to comfort the users. In view of this point,
we first divide one page into multiple rows and each row contains consecutive l slot. Then, we
constrain that there are at most c ad items displayed in thess l slots. We call this model as the
sparse integrated ad system – row (SIASR).
From the mathematical perspective, we add a group of constraints,
∑
i∈A
∑(m+1)l
k=ml+1 xik(v) ≤
c, m = 0, 1, . . . , bK/lc and ∑i∈A∑Kk=bK/lcl+1 xik(v) ≤ c to X . Denote the new constraints feasi-
ble set as X˜ . Observing the new added constraints, we can find that each one is a constraint on the
number of ad items of every l slots. In another word, if we divide one result page into bK/lc + 1
parts, every part is an IAS with number budget on ad items. Consequently, for each part, we can run
mechanismM′(c) iteratively to obtain optimal arrangements. Based on the results in Section 4.1,
the rank is scheduled by the revised virtual values, iteratively. As a result, if every part can gain
an optimal arrangement, the global arrangement is still optimal. Therefore, we derive the optimal
mechanism in this setting, defined as M˜(c, l).
Mechanism M˜(c, l).
1. Run mechanismM′(c) to allocate the first l slots on all items;
2. Run mechanismM′(c) to allocate the next l slots on all remaining items;
3. Repeat step 2 until no slot need to be allocated. (In the last round, the number of slots may
be less than l);
4. The payment rule p˜(v) has the same form as (6).
For the constrained problem, similar method and analysis as before are feasible, because we
can execute mechanism M˜(c, l) to solve the inner problem. Nevertheless, we still need to show
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that the inner problem has a 0-1 form optimal solution in X˜ . The specific proof can be found in
Appendix B.5.
Theorem 5. For the sparse IAS, the relaxed inner problem of constrained problem can be constructed
as a min-cost max-flow problem, and has a 0-1 form optimal solution.
Given this, we can design the optimal mechanisms to satisfy the sparse requirements.
4.2.2 The Sparsity on Column
In last subsection, we discuss the layout of search results page on terminal of personal computer. In
this extension, we would like to investigate the case in terminal of mobile devices. Generally, after
inputting a keyword, the search results are displayed in one column (not the same as the layout of
terminal of personal computer). If we still want to restrict the sparsity of ads, we need to add the
constraints on every consecutive l slots, i.e., we constrain that there are at most c ad items displayed
in any consecutive l slots. Add the new constraints,
∑
i∈A
∑m+l
k=m+1 xik(v) ≤ c,m = 0, 1, . . . ,K − l
, into original problems Denote the new constraints feasible set as Xˆ . We call this model as the
sparse integrated ad system – column (SIASC).
It can be find that the difference between SIASR and SIASC is that there are more sparsity
constraints on consecutive slots. In reality, for the first l slots, the constraint is the same. Intuitively,
The allocation for first slots should also be the same. After deciding the first l slots and observing
the next constraint on slot 2 to slot l + 1, it only need to decide which item (ad item or organic
item) should be allocated to slot l + 1 to meet the sparsity constraint. In this way, we can continue
filling the following slots by checking the criteria of sparsity.
Mechanism Mˆ(c, l).
1. Run mechanismM′(c) to allocate the first l slots on all items;
2. Run mechanism M′(c − a) to allocate the next slot on all remaining items, where a is the
number of ad items in last l − 1 slots;
3. Repeat step 2 until no slot need to be allocated;
4. The payment rule p˜(v) has the same form as (6).
As for the constrained problem, similarly, we still exploit Lagrangian Dual method to deal with.
More specifically, in this case, we call the mechanism Mˆ(c, l) to solve the inner problem. Then,
execute Algorithm 1 with the replace mechanismM by Mˆ(c, l) to output the optimal λ. The last
work needs to be solved is whether the 0-1 form solution is the optimal solution of inner problem.
In reality, imitating the construction in Proof of Theorem 5 and revising a little detail can finish
this work. The specific method is that based on Figure 2, we only need to add a mount of nodes,
ki to represent more groups and add the arcs s
′′
j ki, j ∈ {i, i + 1, · · · , i + l − 1} and arcs kit. The
corresponding capacities and weights are same as before. It is not hard to check that under this
construction, the inner problem can be transferred to a min-cost max-flow problem, thus has a 0-1
form optimal solution.
5 Experiments
In this section, we will verify our mechanisms with four experiments. The experiments are con-
ducted by the real date collected from one Chinese major e-commerce platform. Our experimental
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background is that we select 356 different keywords randomly, where each keyword contains at
least 400 and at most 2000 candidate items(including ad items and organic items). For each key-
word, we simulate the first result page with 20 slots. We find that the values of ad items are fitted
into a lognormal distribution, and assume that quality factor wi = 1 for experiment 1-3, but has a
distribution in experiment 4. The estimated volumes of items can be extracted from the real data,
directly. Because of the diversity of keywords and to avoid speciality, we repeat experiments on
each keyword and aggregate into normalized results. All Figures can be found in Appendix C.
5.1 The Monotonicity of Revenue and Volume
The first experiment aims to testify the availability of mechanism M. We exploit eleven different
values of the weighted coefficient α from 0 to 1 with equal gap 0.1. When α is determined, for
each keyword, we generate a group of random bids by the lognormal distribution 5 learned from
the real data and run mechanism M, recording the corresponding revenue and GMV. We repeat
this experiment for 5000 times, and take mean of the revenues and GMVs as the expected revenue
and expected GMV of this keyword. Aggregating the results of all keywords, we bring forth the
final result shown in Figure 3.
Observing from Figure 3, we can see that as α increases from 0 to 1, revenue improves while
GMV decreases, which fulfills our intuition that the two objectives are in conflict. Hence, if plat-
forms focus more on revenue (or GMV), they only need to adjust the parameter α of mechanism
M. On the other hand, for each α, how much fraction of optimal value the mechanismM achieves
can be found from Figure 3. This can help the platform choose the appropriate α to balance the
revenue and volume in practice.
5.2 The Execution of Theorem 3
The second experiment aims to verify Theorem 3. For each keyword, we give eleven different
threshold of GMV (we pick up them from 0 to maximum feasible GMV with equal gap). For each
threshold, we execute Algorithm 1 to derive optimal λ∗, computing the corresponding α∗. During
executing Algorithm 1, since V (x) is a calculus, we always repeat generating bids for 500 times
and take mean of GMVs as the value of V (x). After testing all the thresholds, we can depict the
relationship curve of V0 and α, shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the larger of the volume threshold (i.e., V0) is, the smaller α will be.
This result is coincident with experiment 3. The most significant point is that, for constrained prob-
lem, it can be transferred into an unconstrained problem, which reduces the difficulty of operation.
Experiment 4 also shows the correctness of Theorem 3 and operability of our mechanism.
5.3 Priority of Our Mechanisms
5.3.1 Uncorrelated Case
By the third experiment, we want to compare our optimal mechanism with the commonly used
mechanism(i.e., only taking out some particular topmost slots to ad items). First, we fix several
topmost slots, and run Myerson optimal auction6. For organic part, we allocate organic items to
5The number of generating bids is the number of advertisers bidding for this keyword in real data. For different
keywords, we may learn the different lognormal distributions.
6Note that the platforms usually run generalized second-price(GSP) auction. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) showed
that when all advertisers have identical regular distributions of values, the expected revenue of GSP with reserve price r∗
such that φ(r∗) = 0 in the bidder-optimal envy-free equilibrium is the same as the expected revenue of Myerson auction.
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the remaining slots by their volumes sorted in non-increasing order. In this way, we can compute
the expected revenue and GMV in the traditional layout. Then, we use the just obtained GMV as
the threshold V0 and run mechanism M¯, deriving another expected revenue from our mechanism.
Repeat the above procedure, as the number of fixed slots changes from 1 to 8. Finally, we compare
the expected revenue gained in two mechanisms and illustrate them in Figure 5.
From Figure 5 we can see, on the premise of reaching the same GMV, the revenue curve of
our mechanism lies on the top of that of Myerson optimal mechanism. The main reason is that,
the conventional layout always maximize revenue in particular slots and then maximize GMV in
the rest slots, which are separate two steps, while we maximize revenue and guarantee GMV,
simultaneously. Therefore, IAS is more flexible, and can keep the same GMV but gain more revenue.
This also reflects the superiority of mixture arrangements.
5.3.2 Correlated Case
The last experiment is based on the third experiment. In this experiment, we assume that the
quality factor, wi, follows a distribution(we learn that it is fitted into a beta distribution). We
wonder that, if there exists a correlation between wi and vi, what the results of experiment 3 will
be. Five different correlation coefficients, -1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, are studied. For each correlation
coefficient, we do the experiment 3 and depict revenue curves. We union five pictures into one
figure shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6 illustrates that, except the condition of totally negative correlation, other conditions
present the similar trend as Figure 5. However, when correlation coefficient changes from 1 to
-0.5, the largest revenue gap becomes smaller. As for Figure 6(a), it can be explained as that, when
the quality factor and value have a negative correlation, the ad items with higher value contribute
less GMV, because their quality factor are relatively smaller, which leads the fact that the wigi is
smaller. To achieve the same GMV, our mechanism may sacrifice some revenue. In brief, except
some extreme conditions, our mechanism show the advantage even if there exists the correlation
between wi and vi.
6 Conclusion
To sum up, for the new features of e-commerce online platforms that combine advertisement and
organic items for display purposes, we offer a thorough and exact study on designing mechanisms
to balance both areas of ”volume” and revenue. Note that our objective of ’volume’ can be replaced
by other metrics that can be incorporated into the platform. For different ways of trade-off and
practical requirements, optimal feasible mechanisms can be designed in order to realize them. We
also empirically evaluate our mechanism and demonstrate its advantage.
As far as we know, our research is the first through study on mixed arrangement of advertise-
ment items and organic items. There are still many problems remain open, to name a few:
• In this paper, we only focus on feasible mechanisms. There may exist mechanisms which are
not limed to BIC or IR that can realize a higher trade-off.
• The valuation distribution is publicly known to each advertiser. A further area to explore
would be how to design mechanisms that avoid cheating on distribution.
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A Example and Tables
A.1 Example 1
In this section, we will give an example to illustrate that both GMV and revenue will be better if we
consider organic results and sponsored advertisements at the same time, compared with the mode
of fixed slots of ad items in advance.
Example 1. We consider the mainline of one search-result page setting with 10 slots for items. The
click-through-rates (CTRs) of these 10 slots are from 0.1 to 1 with the same gap. There are total 10
candidates, 3 sponsored advertisements and 7 organic items. The detailed numbers of bids and volumes
are shown in Table 1, where the ids of items are ranked by the volume.
In Table 1, we fix the top 3 slots for the ads and run the GSP mechanism, that is, if an advertiser
wins, she only need to pay the lowest price that can keep the current slot. Then we rank the rest organic
items by GMV, obtaining the outcome of the conventional pattern. The GMV and revenue in this setting
are 451.3 and 21.9.
id type volume bid rank by bid payment CTR actual
gmv
actual
payment
A1 ad 70 15 15 12 1 70 12
A2 ad 75 12 12 11 0.9 67.5 9.9
A3 ad 90 11 11 0 0.8 72 0
O1 organic 100 0 0 0.7 70 0
O2 organic 90 0 0 0.6 54 0
O3 organic 85 0 0 0.5 42.5 0
O4 organic 80 0 0 0.4 32 0
O5 organic 75 0 0 0.3 22.5 0
O6 organic 70 0 0 0.2 14 0
O7 organic 68 0 0 0.1 6.8 0
Total 451.3 21.9
Table 1: GSP mechanism
Now, we regard organic results and advertisements as an entirety and rank them at the same time.
Think over a new allocation method: rank by 0.5bid + 0.5volume for all items and for advertisements,
still charge the lowest price that keeps the current slot. The result is shown in Appendix, Table 2. The
GMV and revenue are enhanced to 465.8 and 22.
We can see the layout of mixed arrangement presented by Table 2 performs better on both GMV and
revenue. This answers the second question and shows that the mixed arrangement could benefit.
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id type volume bid rank by
0.5bid +
0.5volume
payment CTR actual
gmv
actual
payment
A3 ad 90 11 50.5 10 1 90 10
O1 organic 100 0 50 0.9 90 0
O2 organic 90 0 45 0.8 72 0
A2 ad 75 12 43.5 10 0.7 52.5 7
O3 organic 85 0 42.5 0.6 51 0
A1 ad 70 15 42.5 10 0.5 35 5
O4 organic 80 0 40 0.4 32 0
O5 organic 75 0 37.5 0.3 22.5 0
O6 organic 70 0 35 0.2 14 0
O7 organic 68 0 34 0.1 6.8 0
Total 465.8 22
Table 2: Integrated mechanism
A.2 The Symbols of Integrated Ad System
n1 the number of advertisers
n2 the number of organic items
i one advertisement or one organic item
k one slot
wi the weight of ad or organic item i
vi the value of ad or organic item i
Fi(vi) the cdf of vi
fi(vi) the pdf of vi
φi(vi) the virtual value of ad or organic item i
gi the estimate merchandise volume per click of ad or organic item i
βk the effective exposure of slot k
Table 3: The Symbols of Integrated Ad System
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B Proofs and Algorithm
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. To maximize the objective function (4), the mechanism needs to maximize the objective∫
V
∑
i∈I
(αφi(vi) + (1− α)gi)wixi(v)f(v)dv − α
∑
i∈I
Ui(x, p, 0). (9)
Proof. Plugging (2) and (3) into (4), we can rewrite the objective function as
OBJ = α · Revenue + (1− α)Volume
(†)
= α
(∫
V
∑
i∈I
pi(v)wixi(v)f(v)dv
)
+ (1− α)
∫
V
∑
i∈I
giwixi(v)f(v)dv
(‡)
= α
[
−
∑
i∈I
Ui(x, p, 0) +
∫
V
∑
i∈I
φi(vi)wixi(v)f(v)dv
]
+ (1− α)
∫
V
∑
i∈I
giwixi(v)f(v)dv
=
∫
V
∑
i∈I
wi(αφi(vi) + (1− α)gi)xi(v)f(v)dv − α
∑
i∈I
Ui(x, p, 0). (10)
where (†) follows from that organic items pay nothing to platforms, and (‡) is the previous conclu-
sion from Myerson (1981).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. V (xλ) is non-decreasing on λ.
Proof. Assume there are two numbers λ2 > λ1 ≥ 0. The corresponding optimal allocations are
xλ2(v) and xλ1(v), respectively. By the optimality, we have∫
V
n∑
i=1
wi(φi(vi) + λ1gi)x
λ1
i (v)f(v)dv − λ1V0 ≥
∫
V
n∑
i=1
wi(φi(vi) + λ1gi)x
λ2
i (v)f(v)dv − λ1V0,∫
V
n∑
i=1
wi(φi(vi) + λ2gi)x
λ2
i (v)f(v)dv − λ2V0 ≥
∫
V
n∑
i=1
wi(φi(vi) + λ2gi)x
λ1
i (v)f(v)dv − λ2V0.
Combining the two inequalities, we have
(λ2 − λ1)
∫
V
n∑
i=1
wigi(x
λ2
i (v)− xλ1i (v))f(v)dv = (λ2 − λ1)(V (xλ2)− V (xλ1)) ≥ 0.
Since λ2 > λ1, we obtain V (xλ2)− V (xλ1) ≥ 0. It indicates the monotonicity.
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B.3 Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1 Dichotomy for Outer Problem
Input: A small number  > 0, a large number λmax which makes V (xλmax) ≥ V0.
Output: Optimal λ∗.
1: Initially, let λ = 0 and run mechanismM with α = 1.
2: if V (x0) ≥ V0 then
3: λ∗ = 0.
4: else
5: λmin = 0;
6: while λmax − λmin >  do
7: Let λmid = (λmax + λmin)/2 and run mechanismM with α = 1/(1 + λmid).
8: if V (xλmid) ≥ V0 then
9: λmax = λmid.
10: else
11: λmin = λmid.
12: end if
13: end while
14: end if
15: return λ∗.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. For the IAS with budget on ad items, the relaxed inner problem of constrained problem
can be constructed as a min-cost max-flow problem, and has a 0-1 form optimal solution.
Proof. This problem, indeed, can be reduced to a min-cost max-flow problem, shown by Figure 1.
In Figure 1, ai and oj represent advertisement items and organic items, respectively. pk represents
Figure 1: Min-cost max-flow network
the slots.
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The capacities of directed arcs from left to right are: the upper bound of SA is c, and the upper
bound of SO is infinity. For Aai, Ooj , aipk, ojpk, ∀i, j, k, the upper bound of capacity is 1. As for
pkt, ∀k, we require its flow to be 1.
The cost of directed arcs are: for aipk or ojpk, ∀, i, j, k, the cost of unit flow is−wi(φi(vi)+λgi)βk
or −wjλgjβk. For other arcs, the cost is 0.
We can check that the total cost generating from above flow is equal to the objective function
of inner problem. Since this min-cost max-flow problem has a 0-1 form optimal solution, the
conclusion can be proved.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For the sparse IAS, the relaxed inner problem of constrained problem can be constructed
as a min-cost max-flow problem, and has a 0-1 form optimal solution.
Proof. We still reduce this problem into a min-cost max-flow problem, shown in Figure 2. In Figure
2, ai and oj represent advertisement items and organic items, respectively. s′k and s
′′
k represent the
slots. ki is the node to restrict number of advertisements in group i. sk is the node to restrict that
one slot only has one piece of content. The capacities of directed arcs are: except that for skt, ∀k,
Figure 2: Min-cost max-flow network 2
we require its flow to be 1, for ais′′k, ∀i, k, the upper bound of capacity is 2, and for kit, ∀i, the
upper bound of capacity is c, the others’ upper bound are 1.
The cost of directed arcs are: for ais′′k, ∀i, k, the cost of unit flow is −(wi(φi(vi) + λgi)βk)/2; for
ojs
′
k, ∀, i, j, k, the cost of unit flow is −wjλgjβk. For other arcs, the cost is 0.
In this network, the flow from s′′j to sj and the flow from s
′′
j to ki can be different, but in the
original constraints, they must be the same. In reality, we loose the constraints slightly. However,
the flow passing the s′′j must be split equally in the optimal solution, since they are bounded by
capacity 1. It means that optimal solution of this min-cost max-flow problem still located in the
feasible region of original problem. We also can check that the total cost generating from above
flow is equal to the objective function of inner problem. Therefore, there exists a 0-1 form optimal
solution.
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C The Figures of Experiments
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Figure 3: Expected revenue and GMV under different α
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Figure 5: Comparison between two mechanisms
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Figure 6: Correlation experiments
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